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Debt Bondage: How Private Collection Agencies 
Keep the Formerly Incarcerated Tethered to the 
Criminal Justice System 
Bryan L. Adamson* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the constitutionality of statutes which allow courts to transfer 
outstanding legal financial obligations to private debt collection agencies. In Washington 
State, the clerk of courts can transfer the legal financial obligation of a formerly 
incarcerated person if he or she is only thirty days late making a payment. Upon transfer, 
the debt collection agencies can assess a “collection fee” of up to 50% of the first $100.000 
of the unpaid legal financial obligation, and up to 35% of the unpaid debt over $100,000. 
This fee becomes part of the LFO debt imposed at sentencing, and like that debt, must also 
be paid in full. Interest accrues at 12% per annum, there is no account for a LFO debtor’s 
indigence or ability to pay, and the collection fee is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Not 
only do these collection fees further consign a formerly incarcerated person to a lifetime 
of poverty and exacerbate already-severe barriers to community re-entry, but they increase 
the risks for re-arrest and re-incarceration. Equally troubling is that these fees extend the 
time during which an ex-offender is tethered to the criminal justice system. This Article 
argues that Washington State’s collection agency referral law, and similar laws in other 
states, may violate constitutional due process and excessive fine edicts. 
INTRODUCTION 
While vital work is being directed to address America’s execrable mass incarceration 
rates and their disproportionate impacts upon people of color,1 we also see growing efforts 
to reform an invariable component of criminal conviction: legal financial obligations 
 
* Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law, 1990. M.A., Purdue University, 1987. B.S./Ph.B., Miami University, 1985 
1 See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (2012); JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK 
AMERICA (2017); BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2014). 
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(LFOs).2 An LFO is a monetary sanction—a fine, penalty, cost, fee or other expense3 
imposed upon a defendant as part of a sentencing order and judgment in a misdemeanor or 
felony case.4 LFOs represent more than the financial penalty a law might require when a 
defendant is convicted of a given crime. LFOs are also levied for scores of other 
consequences of involvement in the criminal justice system, including victim 
compensation, court-appointed counsel, deferred prosecution, appeals, DNA collection, 
community supervision, appeals, and incarceration itself.5 In the State of Washington for 
example, a defendant with one conviction is subject to twenty-eight different monetary 
sanctions.6  
For convicted defendants, LFOs can easily swell into the thousands of dollars. And, 
more often than not, they do. In Washington, individuals with felony convictions owe an 
average of $2,540.00 in LFOs.7 That amount does not include the annual 12% statutory 
interest that begins to accrue upon sentencing.8 To add to the financial consequences of 
criminal convictions, felony defendants often face multiple charges and thus may be under 
separate, cumulative LFO obligations.9 Like a term of imprisonment, LFO payment 
obligations are a condition of sentence.10 It follows that repayment aggravates LFO 
debtors’ financial hardships. 
 
2 See class action cases such as Fant v. City of Ferguson, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (persons 
repeatedly jailed by the City of Ferguson for being unable to pay fines owed to the City from traffic tickets 
and other minor offenses, without being afforded an attorney and without any inquiry into their ability to 
pay); Kennedy v. City of Biloxi, No. 1:15-cv-00348-HSO-JCG (S.D. Miss. 2015) (challenging practice of 
jailing those unable to pay their fines, fees, or court costs), dismissed, No. 1:15cv348-HSO-JCG (S.D. 
Miss. 2016); Johnson v. Jessup, 381 F. Supp. 3d 619 (M.D.N.C. 2019) (challenging practice by North 
Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles to revoke drivers licenses of those unable to pay traffic fines or court 
costs); Fuentes v. Benton Cty., No. 15-2-02976-1 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2016) (order preliminarily approving 
class action settlement), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/fuentes-v-benton-county-order-granting-
plaintiffs-motion-preliminary-approval (settlement entered after legal challenge to practice of trial court’s 
jailing, threatening to jail, and forcing manual labor on indigent people for failure to pay legal financial 
obligations). 
3 A legal financial obligation (LFO) is “a sum of money that is ordered by a superior court of the state of 
Washington for legal financial obligations which may include restitution to the victim, statutorily imposed 
crime victims’ compensation fees as assessed . . . court costs, county or interlocal drug funds, court-
appointed attorneys’ fees, and costs of defense, fines, and any other financial obligation that is assessed to 
the offender as a result of a felony conviction.” WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(31) (2019). 
4 WASH. REV. CODE § RCW 9.94A.030 (31). See also WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760(1) (upon conviction, 
“the court may order the payment of a legal financial obligation as part of the sentence.”). 
5 See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.160 (2019); see also WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.20.020–021 (2019), which 
establishes that crimes classified as “Class C Felonies” (e.g. assault) are punishable by up to five years’ 
imprisonment, a fine of up to $10,000, or both.  
6Alexes Harris et al., Monetary Sanctions in Washington, in MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 201, 211–12 (2017), http://www.monetarysanctions.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/Monetary-Sanctions-Legal-Review-Final.pdf. 




9 See generally ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR THE 
POOR (2016).  
10 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760(11) (2019). 
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Over three quarters of Washington’s felony defendants are indigent.11 Because of 
their indigent status, recently incarcerated persons are, at best, able to pay only a little per 
month— $25.00 or often less.12 As a result, it may take years, if not decades, to pay down 
the principal alone on the average LFO debt. This Article examines a little-discussed 
consequence of LFO debt that literally and figuratively multiplies the hardships of LFO 
debtors: court-imposed LFO debt that is referred to private debt collection agencies 
(DCAs). 
In Washington, courts are authorized to contract with DCAs to service and collect 
outstanding LFOs.13 Revised Code of Washington (RCW) Section 19.16.500 allows the 
clerk of courts14 to transfer a non-incarcerated debtor’s LFO obligations to its DCA if the 
debtor is a mere thirty days delinquent.15 By law, that transfer allows a DCA to impose a 
“collection fee” up to 50% of the outstanding LFO under than $100,000 and 35% of the 
unpaid debt over $100,000.16 In addition, a DCA will levy a 12% per annum charge on its 
collection fee.17 
An example is helpful to demonstrate just how LFO debt compounds: “John” was 
sentenced to one year in prison and $2,540.00 in fines, fees and restitution. The mandatory 
12% statutory interest on John’s debt will add $305.00 to his obligation while John is 
incarcerated. Upon release, he makes $30.00 in monthly payments, it will be twenty-five 
 
11 WASH. STATE OFFICE OF PUB. DEF., 2018 STATUS REPORT ON PUBLIC DEFENSE IN WASHINGTON STATE 
18–56 (May 2019), https://www.opd.wa.gov/documents/00732-2019_StatusReport.pdf (calculated from 
submitted data by county).  
12 HARRIS, supra note 9, at 56. On average, LFO debtors pay $31.25 per month. 
13 WASH. REV. CODE § 36.18.190 (2019) (“Superior court clerks may contract with collection agencies 
under chapter 19.16 RCW or may use county collection services for the collection of unpaid court-ordered 
legal financial obligations as enumerated in RCW § 9.94A.030 that are ordered pursuant to a felony or 
misdemeanor conviction and of unpaid financial obligations imposed under Title 13 RCW. The costs for 
the agencies or county services shall be paid by the debtor.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.16.500(1)(a) (2019) 
(“Agencies, departments, taxing districts, political subdivisions of the state, counties, and cities may retain, 
by written contract, collection agencies licensed under this chapter for the purpose of collecting public 
debts owed by any person, including any restitution that is being collected on behalf of a crime victim.”). 
14 Clerks of courts are charged with administering the LFO payment processes for non-incarcerated debtors. 
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760(5) (“The county clerk is authorized to collect unpaid legal 
financial obligations at any time the offender remains under the jurisdiction of the court for purposes of his 
or her legal financial obligations.”). Department of Corrections is charged with LFO administration for 
those in jail or prison. WASH. REV. CODE § 72.65.050 (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 72.65.060. While an 
inmate remains in custody, LFOs are paid through automatic twenty percent deductions from most of the 
deposits placed into an inmate trust account. WASH. REV. CODE § 72.09.111(1)(a)(iv).  
15 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.16.500(2). 
16 “The amount to be paid for collection services shall be left to the agreement of the governmental entity 
and its collection agency or agencies, but a contingent fee of up to fifty percent of the first one hundred 
thousand dollars of the unpaid debt per account and up to thirty-five percent of the unpaid debt over one 
hundred thousand dollars per account is reasonable, and a minimum fee of the full amount of the debt up to 
one hundred dollars per account is reasonable. Any fee agreement entered into by a governmental entity is 
presumptively reasonable.” WASH. REV. CODE § 19.16.500(1)(b). 
17 Per WASH. REV. CODE § 19.16.500 (3), “[c]ollection agencies assigned debts under section [WASH. REV. 
CODE § 19.16.500(3)] shall have only those remedies and powers which would be available to them as 
assignees of private creditors.” Under WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.020(1), collection agencies can charge 
interest on collection accounts “so long as the rate of interest does not exceed…[t]welve percent per 
annum[.]” 
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years before his LFO is paid off.18 Now say, after two payments, John misses his third. 
Thirty days after the missed payment, the clerk of courts refers his debt to its DCA. Again, 
as allowed by law, the debt collector adds a fifty percent collection fee to John’s 
outstanding LFO debt. John’s $2,845.00 debt becomes $4,267.00. The DCA then levies 
the 12% statutory interest against the court-imposed LFO and to the debt it is now owed. 
John resumes his $30.00 monthly payments. The DCA then levies a payment plan set up 
fee, a monthly maintenance fee, and a convenience fee for payment by credit card. After 
year one, John will owe at least $4,360.00 to the court and the DCA. In ten years, John will 
owe $6,570.00. The debt continues to negatively amortize, such that in year twenty-five, 
John will owe $24,408.00. In other words, as direct result of the fees that the DCA is 
allowed by law to extract—fees that grow far larger than the LFO to which he was 
originally sentenced—John will never be able to pay off his debt.  
LFO obligations remain a mandatory condition of probation, parole, or other 
correctional supervision. Further, LFO obligations are not dischargeable in bankruptcy,19 
and failure to pay LFOs can result in re-arrest and re-incarceration.20 Those with LFOs in 
collection are also exposed to risk of to civil judgments, liens, tax refund interception, and 
wage garnishment.21 In other words, all things remaining equal, John likely will be tethered 
to the criminal justice system and yoked to a private debt collection agency for life. 
The State of Washington is not alone in allowing exorbitant “collection fees” as a 
percentage of the outstanding debt upon the transfer of LFO debt to DCAs: Florida (40%), 
Alabama (30%), Texas (30%), and Illinois (30%) are just a few examples.22 These transfers 
can effectively extend the criminal sentence of formerly incarcerated persons through fee 
extraction on the outstanding debt. Under each statutory regime, the “collection fee” levied 
 
18  Under this hypothetical, a monthly payment less than $27.00—still outside of the affordability for an 
indigent debtor—will never pay the debt down, as it is insufficient to cover even the accruing interest. 
19  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (2018); State of Washington Dept. of Corrections Policy DOC 200.380 
(Restitution and other LFOs are non-dischargeable under Chapters 7 and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code). 
20 A court can impose further punishment if an offender violates any condition or requirement of a 
sentence. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760. However, the 14th Amendment bars courts from revoking 
probation for failure to pay legal financial obligations without first inquiring into a person’s ability to pay 
and considering alternatives to imprisonment. See generally Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983). 
While a defendant cannot be imprisoned for nonpayment due to indigence, imprisonment for willful or 
contumacious failure to pay is not prohibited. In 1983, the Supreme Court ruled that a debtor can be 
imprisoned for criminal justice debt only when he has an ability to pay, but willfully refuses to do so. 
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1970) (extending maximum prison term because a person is too 
poor to pay fines or court costs violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 10.01.180(1) (2019) (“A defendant sentenced to pay any fine, penalty, assessment, fee, or costs 
who willfully defaults in the payment thereof or of any installment is in contempt of court[,], and “[t]he 
court may issue a warrant of arrest for his or her appearance.”). Moreover, Washington Const. art. 1, § 17, 
prohibiting imprisonment for debt, would likely preclude imprisonment solely for inability to pay. 
21  WASH. REV. CODE § 6.27.150 (2019). One jurisdiction’s practice of shutting off LFO debtor’s utilities 
until a payment is made is being challenged. See Southern Center for Human Rights, SCHR Continues to 
Challenge LaGrange, GA, Policies That Restrict Access to Basic Utility Services, SCHR.ORG (Mar. 26, 
2018), https://blog.schr.org/2018/03/26/schr-continues-to-challenge-lagrange-ga-policies-that-restrict-
access-to-basic-utility-services/.  
22 ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 
17 (2010), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Criminal-Justice-Debt-%20A-
Barrier-Reentry.pdf. While these states have referral structures similar to Washington State, the mechanism 
through which they are set up (e.g., statute, administration rule) differ in ways that would impel a different 
constitutional analysis.  
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by a DCA then becomes part of the LFO debt.23 This scenario unfolds by operation of law, 
occurs without adequate notice or a pre-transfer hearing, without an ability to pay 
assessment, and without examination as to whether the “collection fee” imposed is 
excessive.  
The collateral consequences of LFO debt are demonstrably severe. Outstanding 
LFOs limit access to public and private housing, gainful employment, and damage credit, 
and they render debtors unable to establish bank accounts, obtain financial aid for 
educational or job training programs, and foreclose them from obtaining professional 
licenses.24 Individuals with even one missed payment can have their driver’s license 
revoked and are denied from accessing public benefits, such as Temporary Aid to Needy 
Families, low income housing, Supplementary Nutrition Assistance Program benefits, and 
Supplemental Security Income for the elderly and disabled.25 LFO debtors with felony 
convictions cannot have their voting rights restored until their LFO debt is satisfied.26 LFO 
obligations effectively operate like a modern-day poll tax, and this is playing out most 
notoriously in Florida.27 LFOs exacted by DCAs extend these consequences into a formerly 
incarcerated person’s lifetime, heighten the barriers to community re-entry, and prolong 
the social stigmas associated with felony conviction.  
LFO debt also affects individuals’ perceptions of the criminal justice system and their 
images of themselves and their futures. As one recently incarcerated person said about this 
spiral of debt in a report prepared by the American Civil Liberties Union: “I have a balance 
of $1838.74, and that’s exactly what I owe in interest. It’s discouraging to keep paying and 
 
23 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.16.500(4) (2019) (“For purposes of this section, the term debt shall include fines 
and other debts, including the [collection] fee allowed under subsection (1)(b) of this section.”). 
24 See Tarra Simmons, Transcending the Stigma of a Criminal Record: A Proposal to Reform State Bar 
Character and Fitness Evaluations, 128 YALE L.J.F. 759, 761 (2019); see generally Jamila Jefferson-Jones, 
Extending ‘Dignity Takings’: Re-Conceptualizing the Damage Caused by Criminal History and Ex-
Offender Status, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 863 (2018) (criminal conviction impact on fundamental necessities of 
life). 
25 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(9)(A) (2012)(Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 1437f 
(d)(1)(B)(v)(II)(2018) (low income housing assistance); 7 U.S.C. § 2015(k)(1) (2018) (Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits; 42 U.S.C. § 1382(e)(4)(A)(ii) (2012) (Supplemental 
Security Income).  
26 Thirty states require all LFOs be paid in order for people with conviction records to regain the right to 
vote. ALLYSON FREDERICKSEN & LINNEA LASSITER, ALL. FOR A JUST SOC’Y, DISENFRANCHISED BY DEBT 
11 (Mar. 2016), http://allianceforajustsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Disenfranchised-by-Debt-
FINAL-3.8.pdf. In Washington, upon release from incarceration, the voting rights of a person convicted of 
a felony are provisionally restored. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.08.520(1). However, non-payment of LFOs 
can result in a loss of voting rights if either of the following occurs: 1) if a court finds that the debtor’s 
failure to pay was willful, or 2) if the debtor fails to make three payments in a twelve-month period. WASH. 
REV. CODE § 29A.08.520(2)(a), 2(b) (2013). In the latter case, the county clerk or restitution recipient may 
request the prosecutor to seek the revocation of voting rights. Harris et.al, supra note 6, at 204. Once 
revoked, voting rights are not restored until the individual has made a “good faith effort” to pay, meaning 
the individual has paid the full principal (non-interest) amount, or made at least fifteen monthly payments 
in an eighteen-month period. Id.  
27 Patricia Mazzei, Florida Limits Ex-Felon Voting, Prompting a Lawsuit and Cries of ‘Poll Tax’, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/28/us/florida-felons-voting-rights.html. In 
a move that re-enfranchised more than 1.4 million Florida citizens, Amendment 4 was passed by the 
majority of voters in November 2018. Id. The following June, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis signed into 
law a requirement that those who have committed serious offenses and have LFOs must pay them back in 
full before becoming eligible to vote. Id.  
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see that interest amount grow. It’s exhausting.”28 LFO debt, made worse by the fees DCAs 
are permitted to exact, intensifies perceptions of the criminal justice system as unfair and 
unforgiving. The perpetual cycle of debt repayment also deepens the sense of hopelessness 
many feel toward their ability to escape the burdens of the criminal justice system.  
Four principles inform how we, as a polity, view the ideal outcomes for punishment: 
(1) that it should fit the crime (proportionality); (2) that it should not exceed the minimum 
needed to achieve its purpose (parsimony); (3) that the punishment should not foreclose 
the ability of a formerly incarcerated person’s ability to lead a fulfilling and successful life; 
and (4) that our penal system should avoid reproducing social inequities, especially since 
those involved in the system are already likely the most disadvantaged in our society. In 
the drafting and implementation of RCW 19.16.500, these principles seem to have been 
completely ignored.  
With a focus on LFOs arising out of felony convictions in Washington courts, 29 this 
Article challenges the unique form debt bondage that RCW 19.16.500 exacts. This Article 
contends that Washington State’s legal structure allowing private DCAs to service LFO 
debts of those charged with felonies may violate the 8th Amendment Excessive Fines,30 the 
14th Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection proscriptions,31 and Washington 
State’s constitutional provisions proscribing the same.32 This Article further argues that 
states must discontinue LFO debt referral to private DCAs, re-assume the responsibility of 
collection services, and generally engage in wholesale LFO reform. Part I of this Article 
explains the LFO statutory provisions and processes in Washington and some recent state 
reforms. Part II places LFO debt and the relationship between courts and private enterprises 
into historical context, drawing connections to the convict leasing schemes that emerged 
during Reconstruction and their racial intent and impact. Part III sets forth the results of a 
review of seventy-seven contracts between Washington courts and debt collection 
agencies, their predatory impacts, and associated constitutional concerns. The Article 
closes with reform propositions for the law and use of DCAs.  
I. LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 
To appreciate the impact of RCW 19.16.500 upon the lives of LFO debtors and how 
it extends their involvement with the criminal justice system, it is critical to understand 
 
28 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF WASH. & COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVS., MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS: 
THE WAYS COURT-IMPOSED DEBTS PUNISH PEOPLE FOR BEING POOR 14 (2014). 
29 Although Washington’s statutory scheme applies equally to transfer of misdemeanor LFOs to DCAs, this 
Article is concerned explicitly with felony LFOs because of the cumulative consequences and unique 
disabilities felony debt transfer imposes upon the formerly incarcerated and makes more acute the 
constitutional concerns.  
30 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted.”).  
31 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall…deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
32 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law.”); id. § 12 (“No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other 
than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, 
or corporations.”); id. § 14 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
punishment inflicted.”). For discussion, see infra Part III, at 319.  
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more specifically what constitutes LFOs and the process of imposition and collection in 
Washington state. 
A. LFO Overview 
LFOs are ordered by a court either at sentencing,33 at a restitution hearing,34 or 
following an appeal.35 Generally, LFOs fall into five categories: restitution, fines, costs, 
fees, and surcharges. Restitution is a monetary sum the court orders the defendant to pay a 
victim for damages (e.g., lost wages, medical bills, property loss).36 A fine is also monetary 
penalty, typically established by statute and tied to the type or class of crime.37  Unlike 
fines, which are punitive, costs are imposed to recoup court expenses incurred, for example,  
by probation services, warrant service, juror compensation, or incarceration.38 Fees are 
payments required for specific purposes, such as a victim penalty assessment (VPA),39 
DNA collection, 40 or the debt collection costs. Surcharges are other costs used to support 
court- and state-related functions, typically calculated as a percentage of total LFOs.41 Until 
recently, a statutory interest of 12% attached to all restitution and non-restitution debt upon 
sentencing.42 
Restitution, fines, costs, fees and surcharges can be mandatory or discretionary. 
Restitution and certain fines and costs related to felony convictions are mandatory, and a 
court must impose those without consideration of a defendant’s financial circumstances or 
ability to pay.43 Sanctions for public defender costs,44 criminal filing fees,45 jury fees,46 
appellate costs,47 and costs of incarceration48 are discretionary as to whether or how much 
a defendant must pay. 
 
33 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760(1)(2019)(“Whenever a person is convicted in superior court, the court 
may order the payment of a legal financial obligation as part of the sentence.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 
10.01.160(1)(2019) (“[T]he the court may require a defendant to pay costs” upon conviction). 
34 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.753 (2018) (“When restitution is ordered, the court shall determine the 
amount of restitution due at the sentencing hearing or within one hundred eighty days[.]”). 
35 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.160. 
36 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.753. 
37 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760(10). 
38 HARRIS, supra note 9, at 26.  
39 WASH. REV. CODE § 7.68.035 (2019). 
40 WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.7541 (2019).  
41 Harris et.al., supra note 6, at 10. 
42 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.82.090 (2017) (interest on judgments), superseded by WASH. REV. CODE § 
10.82.090 (2)(a) (2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.110(6) (interest on judgments); WASH. REV. CODE § 
19.52.020 (maximum interest on judgments). 
43 Other mandatory fines include public education and assessment fees. WASH. REV. CODE § 3.67.090 
(equal to 75% of the fines, forfeitures or penalties imposed, costs of supervision, and fines for Violation of 
the Uniform Controlled Substance Act. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.430 (2019)). 
44 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.160 (2) (2019). 
45 WASH. REV. CODE § 36.18.020(h) (2019). 
46 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.46.190; WASH. REV. CODE § 10.64.015. 
47 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.160. 
48  WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.160; WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760.  
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While there are mechanisms by which an incarcerated person can pay down LFO 
debt,49 a person is under an affirmative obligation to begin payment on any outstanding 
amounts upon release from incarceration if they have not been making payments while 
incarcerated. Clerks of court or the department of corrections (in the case of incarcerated 
LFO debtors) manage and service LFO debt in the first instance, taking and applying 
payments to a debtor’s account or accounts.50 While not available to incarcerated persons, 
relief from some discretionary LFOs and interest payments can be available. Prior to 2015, 
a person returning from incarceration51 could request modification or remittance of accrued 
interest on non-restitution LFOs if the amounts due would result in “manifest hardship” to 
the debtor or the debtor’s family—if the debtor was not already in default.52 Beginning in 
2015, laws governing LFO debt modification changed dramatically. 
B. LFO Reform in Washington State 
The 2015 Washington Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Blazina53  marked a 
watershed moment in Washington LFO reform. In Blazina, Nicholas Blazina was 
sentenced to twenty months in prison for second degree assault.54 Co-petitioner Mauricio 
Paige-Colter was sentenced to thirty years for first degree assault and unlawful possession 
of a firearm.55 Along with Blazina’s prison sentence, he was charged a $500 victim penalty 
assessment, a $200 filing fee, a $100 DNA sample fee, a $400 assigned counsel fee, and a 
$2,087.87 assessment for extradition costs. Paige-Colter, as part of his judgment and 
sentence, was charged a $500 crime victim penalty assessment, a $200 filing fee, a $100 
fee for the DNA sample, a $1500 assigned counsel fee, and restitution by a later order.56 
At the time, a trial court had discretion to order costs, but it was not required to look 
at a defendant’s current and future ability to pay. The court did not conduct an ability to 
pay determination for either defendant.57 While it did not discuss the constitutional 
questions, the Washington Supreme Court held that a sentencing judge must “make an 
individualized inquiry into the defendant's current and future ability to pay” before 
imposing LFOs and do so on the record.58 Such an inquiry also demands that the sentencing 
court consider factors such as whether the defendant will be incarcerated and the 
defendant’s other debts, including restitution.59 Because the record did not reflect that the 
 
49 See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 72.09.111, 480 (2019), which set forth the method by which LFO deductions 
are debited from inmate accounts—typically monies given to inmates by families and friends or earned 
through work while incarcerated. 
50  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760(5) authorizes the county clerk “to collect unpaid legal financial 
obligations at any time the offender remains under the jurisdiction of the court for purposes of his or her 
legal financial obligations.” See also, WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.753(4) (authorizing collection of 
restitution); § 9.94A.760(5) (authorizing collection of fees), and WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760(9) 
(authorizing collection of costs).  
51WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.160(4) (2019).   
52 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.180 (5); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.160(4).    
53 344 P.3d 680 (Wash. 2015).  
54 Id. at 681. 
55 Id. at 682. 
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 685. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
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trial court had engaged in that inquiry, the court reversed and remanded on the LFO 
determinations.60 
In the wake of Blazina, law reform related to LFOs accelerated, culminating in 
sweeping changes to dozens of statutes that touched upon Washington’s LFO regime. In 
2018, HB 1783 ushered in changes regarding standards for indigency determinations, 
classification of mandatory LFOs, interest rates, and community service. RCW 10.01.160, 
which codifies Washington’s court costs and fee structure,61 now requires judges to make 
an individualized inquiry into a defendant’s current and future ability to pay at the time of 
sentencing.62 If a defendant is found to be indigent,63 a court may not impose discretionary 
costs.64 The ability to pay directive extends to appellate costs,65 costs of incarceration,66 
and post-conviction sanctions.67 The law also reduced the LFOs that were required to be  
imposed (for example, jury fees68 and conviction fees69 had been mandatory) and limited 
certain assessments to a once-only fee (DNA collection fee).70 However, VPA fees and 
restitution remain compulsory.71 Importantly, courts are now empowered to convert non-
restitution LFOs into community service at a rate no less than the state minimum wage.72 
Regardless of indigence status, HB 1783 also prohibits the accrual of interest on non-
restitution LFOs.73 The law is retroactive so that, upon petition by an LFO debtor, a court 
must waive all interest accrued on all outstanding LFOs except restitution.74 Interest on 
restitution can only be waived or modified after the principal is paid.75  If a LFO debtor 
fails to pay, the court can issue warrants and file show cause motions, but HB 1783 
explicitly prohibits incarceration unless failure to pay is found to be “willful.”76  
 
60 Id.  
61 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.160 (2019) applies only to discretionary costs.  
62  Id. at § 10.01.160(3). 
63 “Indigent” here is defined as follows: (a) receiving public assistance; (b) involuntarily committed to a 
mental health facility; or (c) having a post-tax income less than 125% of the federal poverty level. WASH. 
REV. CODE § 10.101.010(3)(a)–(c).  
64 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.160(3). 
65 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.160(4). 
66 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.160; WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760 (2019). 
67 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.180; WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.6333; WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94B.040. 
68 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.46.190. 
69 WASH. REV. CODE § 3.62.085 (2019). 
70 WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.7541 (2019). In the past, a DNA collection fee was imposed even if the 
defendant had one, or even several prior convictions at which a DNA sample had been submitted and the 
fee assessed. Travis Stearns, Legal Financial Obligations: Fulfilling the Promise of Gideon by Reducing 
the Burden, 11 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST., 963, 967 (2013). 
71 The courts may not reduce or waive the VPA and may not convert the VPA to community restitution. 
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.6333(3)(f); § 10.01.180(5). The crime victim penalty assessment may not be 
reduced, waived, or converted to community restitution hours. Nothing in the act requires the courts to 
refund or reimburse amounts previously paid toward LFOs or interest on LFOs. 
72 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.6333(3); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94B.040(4).  
73 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.82.090. See also WASH. REV. CODE § 3.50.100; WASH. REV. CODE § 3.62.085; 
WASH. REV. CODE § 35.20.220 (2019).  
74 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.82.090(2). The courts are required to waive such interest and may reduce interest 
on restitution if the principal has been paid off. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.82.090(2)(b). 
75 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.82.090. 
76 When determining whether an individual’s failure to pay was willful, the court must consider the 
individual’s income and assets; basic living costs and other liabilities including child support and other 
LFOs; and bona fide efforts to acquire additional resources. The defendant has the burden of showing that 
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C. Unfinished LFO Reform in Washington State 
Despite all of the reforms, LFOs continue to place substantial, if not insurmountable, 
burdens to re-entry upon formerly incarcerated persons. HB 1783 did not go far enough.77   
Greater efforts are needed to inform LFO debtors of their rights and judges of their 
responsibilities. Legal advocates, court administrators, and judges alike admit that, despite 
Blazina and HB 1783, the overwhelming majority of LFO debtors are not aware of their 
rights of remission of non-restitution interest, nor their ability to challenge the failure of a 
sentencing judge to make an individualized inquiry and finding on the defendant’s present 
and future ability to pay.78 Washington district, municipal and superior courts are not 
consistently making the individualized ability to pay assessments—despite Blazina and HB 
1783.79 What is more, many judges view the ability to pay determination as discretionary 
policy, not binding law.80 Judges must be informed of the mandatory nature of the law, and 
robust communication to LFO debtors must be undertaken.  
Very practical but meaningful reforms are also due. While needed reforms took hold 
that clarified clerk discretion in how to allocate LFO payments remitted,81 nothing was 
done to clarify the wildly varying payment methods a debtor encounters in trying to pay 
LFOs. Some jurisdictions accept credit cards, while others only take certified checks.82 
Those jurisdictions with online payment systems charge “convenience fees,” and many 
courts charge fees for a LFO debtor who requests to be placed on a payment plan.83 Debtors 
with LFOs with different cause numbers must remit separate payments for each instead of 
submitting one lump payment.  
 
the failure to pay was not willful. Smith v. Whatcom Cty. Dist. Court, 52 P.3d 485, 492 (Wash. 2002). An 
individual who is indigent is presumed to lack the current ability to pay. WASH. REV. CODE § 
10.01.180(3)(a)–(b). Moreover, if the court determines that an individual is homeless or is a person who is 
mentally ill, failure to pay LFOs is not willful and does not subject the individual to penalties. WASH. REV. 
CODE § 9.94A.6333(3)(d); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760(11); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94B.040(4)(d); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.180(3)(c). If the court finds that failure to pay is not willful, the court may, and 
if the defendant is indigent the court must: (1) modify the terms of payment; (2) reduce or waive non-
restitution amounts; or (3) allow conversion of non-restitution obligations to community restitution hours. 
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.180(5); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.6333(3); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760. 
77 See infra Part IV, at 330.  
78 Interview with Superior Court Judge Linda Coburn, July 9, 2019 (on file with author).  
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.070 (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.170. The priority of payment is 
relevant because, in many counties, a yearly $100 collection fee is collected, and, in the past, the clerk 
could exercise discretion in deciding how to apportion the rest of payment. If, for example, an LFO debtor 
made a $200 payment, and the clerk could direct $100 to the office of public defense and the other $100 to 
the collection fee, and the debtor’s restitution and VPA LFOs go unchanged and accumulating interest.  
82 See, e.g., King Cty. Superior Court, Legal Financial Obligations Collections Program: Paying Court 
Costs, Fees, Fines, and Restitution (last updated Mar. 6, 2018),  
https://www.kingcounty.gov/courts/clerk/programs/LFO.aspx (no personal checks or credit/debit cards); 
Kitsap County, LFO Collections (last updated 2020), https://www.kitsapgov.com/clerk/Pages/Payment-
Information.aspx (allowing all forms of payment but personal check; but convenience fee of $2.00 to 2.4% 
of the transaction amount); Pend Oreille County, Legal Financial Obligations,  
https://pendoreilleco.org/your-government/county-clerk/legal-financial-obligations/ (credit card payments 
allowed and convenience fee assessed). 
83 HARRIS, supra note 9, at 42. Nine other states charge extra fees as a condition to being placed into a 
payment plan. BANNON ET AL., supra note 22, at 14.  
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The financial and time burdens imposed upon LFO debtors due to restrictions on the 
form and method of payment accepted should not be readily dismissed. Many of those 
subjected to LFO debt are likely to be unbanked.84 In such circumstances, the unbanked 
must resort to check cashing services to purchase money orders or certified checks. A 
survey of check-cashing outlets revealed that the average fee charged for money orders 
was $1.08 and ranged from fifty cents to $16.85 To the indigent, these are not insignificant 
costs.  
There should be a uniform, centralized system through which LFO debtors can tender 
their monthly payments without shifting costs upon the debtor. With thirty-nine counties 
and hundreds of courts of limited jurisdiction, variations in collection methods and 
surcharges makes the payment process needlessly costly and burdensome. These myriad 
“poverty penalties”86—the additional late fees, payment plan fees, and interest—are 
exorbitant and exceed ordinary standards of fairness. The cumulative impact of these 
financial penalties means an LFO debtor is effectively consigned to a lifetime of fiscal 
servitude.  
II. A LIFETIME OF FISCAL SERVITUDE 
When placed in historical context, we see more clearly that this type of consignment 
is not new. The criminal justice system generally and the LFO debt repayment regime 
specifically have a targeted and particular impact upon communities of color. As with so 
many aspects of our criminal court systems and institutions, the government’s transfer of 
debt into the hands of private interests is firmly rooted in our country’s legacy of slavery.    
A. Debt Bondage: A Brief History 
“Offender-funded justice” defines the current state of funding for court systems 
across the country.87 The current regime emerged out of a belief that those who “use” the 
system should be the ones who pay for it.88 That ethos was born out of a “smaller 
government” ideology and a movement of state legislatures de-funding court and 
incarceration systems at county and local levels.89 Privatization of court and penal 
operations was not an ideological stretch for policymakers to enable private, for-profit 
entities to step in to manage, and profit from, those caught in the criminal justice system. 
Public-private contracts are a feature in virtually every jurisdiction. Such contracts exist 
not only for prisons and bail bonds, but also for prison telephone and email systems, inmate 
 
84 Ronald Kelly, The Financial Community Has a Role to Play in Improving the Economic Mobility of 
Returning Citizens, CAPITAL IMPACT PARTNERS: BLOG STRATEGY (Apr. 23, 2018), at 
https://www.capitalimpact.org/financial-institutions-economic-mobility-for-returning-citizens/. 
85 JEAN ANN FOX & PATRICK WOODALL, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., CASHED OUT: CONSUMERS PAY STEEP 
PREMIUM TO “BANK” AT CHECK CASHING OUTLETS 7 (Nov. 2006), 
https://consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFA_2006_Check_Cashing_Study111506.pdf. 
86  See BANNON ET AL., supra note 22, at 1. “Poverty penalties” are those additional fees are incurred 
primarily because debtors are unable to pay the full amount due, thus falling on those most impoverished. 
87 Michael Pinard, Poor, Black and “Wanted:” Criminal Justice in Ferguson and Baltimore, 58 HOW. L.J. 
857, 868 (2015).  
88 HARRIS, supra note 9, at 4, 11.  
89 Id. 
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accounts, probation supervision, electronic monitoring, community supervision, health 
care.90 
From debtors’ prisons91 to convict leasing, the facilitation of private profit from those 
subjected to the criminal justice system is not new. At the close of the Civil War, the 
Thirteenth Amendment was ratified to abolish slavery and involuntary servitude.92 Such 
conditions were retained, however, as punishment for a “crime whereof the party shall have 
been duly convicted.”93 Although Congress passed the Anti-Peonage Act in 1867 to 
prohibit coerced labor, “[s]outhern states innovated ways to continue to reap many of the 
economic and labor market benefits of chattel slavery by enacting a network of criminal 
and penal statutes that effectively turned over convicted defendants—most of them newly 
freed slaves—to private employers.”94 Black Code laws required Blacks to sign yearly 
labor contracts.95 South Carolina, for example, prohibited Blacks from holding any 
occupation other than farmer or servant unless they paid an annual tax of $10 to $100.96 
Blacks who broke contracts or failed to pay the tax could be arrested and fined.97 
Criminal vagrancy and loitering laws were especially pernicious and sweeping.98 In 
Mississippi, Blacks would be fined $50 and sentenced to ten days in jail if found in public 
and without lawful employment.99 A loitering offense in Alabama would result in a $50 
fine and six months in jail, and in Florida, a $500 fine and one year in prison.100 These fines 
were intentionally excessive and thus unaffordable, with jail time being the inevitable 
consequence. A feature of the new laws were criminal surety statutes. These statutes 
allowed employers to pay the debts of Blacks who could not pay the fine. In exchange, 
Blacks were forced to work off the debt—e.g. in mines, cotton mills, with local merchants, 
or even on the plantations from which they were emancipated.101 Surety contracts were 
 
90 Alexes Harris, Symposium, Monetary Sanctions as a Permanent Punishment: LFOs in Washington State 
Today in Supreme Court Symposium Legal Financial Obligations (LFOs): Beyond Defining the Problem; 
Advancing Solutions, WASHINGTON STATE AT MINORITY AND JUSTICE COMMISSION (June 6, 2018), 
https://www.tvw.org/watch/?eventID=2018061018. 
91 Debtors’ prisons—jails or other detention facility—housed those incarcerated for owing public and 
private debts. Such prisons were part of a legal structure adapted from Great Britain. In the United States, 
debtors’ prisons were banned under federal law in 1833. Between 1821 and 1849, most states followed suit. 
However, state bans on imprisonment for debt exempted the conviction on a commission of a crime from 
their scope. Tamar R. Birckhead, The New Peonage, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1595, 1628–29 (2015). It 
was not until 1983 that the Supreme Court affirmed that the 14th Amendment barred the incarceration of 
indigent debtors. Id. at 1630. 
92 “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have 
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
93 Birckhead, supra note 91, at 1605 (citation omitted).  
94 See 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2012) (originally enacted as the Peonage Abolition Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 187, 
§ 1, 14 Stat. 546) (providing the civil components of the Anti-Peonage Act); 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2012) 
(originally enacted as Criminal Code, § 269) (providing the criminal penalties of the Anti-Peonage Act); 
Birckhead, supra note 91, at 1606. 
95 Id. at n.53.  
96 DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS 
FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 7 (2008). 
97 Id.  
98 Eric Foner, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICANS UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877 199 (1988).  
99 Blackmon, supra note 96, at 7. 
100 Foner, supra note 98, at 199.  
101 Blackmon, supra note 96, at 50. 
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also extended by the courts if the debt record was “lost” or there was an allegation of a 
defendant’s breach. As a result, the workers became further indebted to their overseers,102 
and a new form of slavery evolved. 
By 1877, a system of convict leasing had been adopted via such laws in Texas and 
every Southern state except Virginia.103 Those laws criminalizing Black life and 
consigning them to forced labor also served to benefit government functions. Alabama’s 
coffers were enriched by fines extracted from convicted Blacks and its courts’ leasing 
arrangements with private.104 In Hale County, Alabama, for example, monies derived from 
convict leasing was placed in the “Fines and Forfeiture Fund,” which was used to pay fees 
for judges, sheriffs, and other officers.105  
Convict leasing and the public-private partnerships in criminal justice systems 
persisted in various forms well into the twentieth century.106 The 1970s ushered in an era 
during which the criminal justice policy shifted towards concerns for victims and victim 
reparations.107 Aptly referred to as the era of the “New Jim Crow,” the re-emergence of 
debtor’s prisons and the punishment of indigency most acutely coincided with the rise of 
mass incarceration beginning in the 1980s.108 It is no coincidence that the incarceration and 
post-incarceration population surged with the creation of new criminal laws and the 
rewriting of others—which included new or enhanced monetary penalties, and allowed for 
imposition of jail time for failure to pay those penalties.109 Between 1980 and 2005, the 
prison population in the United States increased from 500,000 to two million.110 During 
that same time frame, the population of those on parole or probation swelled from 1.34 
million to 4.95 million.111  
As the criminal justice system expanded to accommodate the growing population of 
jails, prisons, probation and parole systems, criminal justice budgets and personnel also 
increased.112 Simultaneously, the “smaller government” ethos guided state fiscal policies 
vis-á-vis local government, resulting in marked decreases in funding by state governments. 
The recession of the late 2000s further entrenched that ideology, accelerating the 
disinvestment of local court and penal operations. Nationally, between 2007–2010, there 
was a net 10–15% decrease in funding of court systems.113 As of 2015, Washington ranked 
 
102 Birckhead, supra note 91, at 1606. 
103 Blackmon, supra note 96, at 39. The conditions under which they worked were unconscionable, in 
dangerous, unhealthy circumstance, and Blacks were routinely starved and brutalized, flogged, chained, 
and shot if they attempted to escape. As a consequence, in Alabama, for example, during the first year of 
convict leasing, 20% of those enslaved died; in the second year, 35% died, and in the third year 45% were 
killed. Id. at 57. 
104 Id. at 53. 
105 Id. at 55–56. 
106 Id. at 56. 
107 Karin D. Martin et al., Shackled to Debt: Criminal Justice Financial Obligations and The Barriers to 
Re-entry They Create, in 4 NEW THINKING IN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 1–23 (Jan. 2017). 
108 See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 1.  
109 For example, in Washington, the Victim Assessment Penalty was $25 in 1977; now it is $500. Harris et 
al., supra note 6, at 201. 
110 PEW CHARITABLE TR., PUBLIC SAFETY, PUBLIC SPENDING: FORECASTING AMERICA’S PRISON 
POPULATION 2007-2011 2 (rev. June 2007), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-
/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/state-based_policy/psppprisonprojections0207pdf.  
111 Id. 
112 HARRIS, supra note 9, at 10.  
113 ABA Resolution 302 and Report 2 (Aug. 8-9, 2011).  
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last in the nation for state funding of trial courts.114 For example, in 2019, its counties paid 
over 96% of the cost of trial court public defense, while the state paid less than 4%.115 At 
the same time, the cost of operating those systems continued to rise.116  
Local governments and courts were compelled to “self-fund” and motivated to 
explore new sources of revenue. They did so through the imposition of fines and fees for 
the “use” of court and penal services. Since 2010, forty-eight states increased civil and 
criminal fees.117 To reiterate, a defendant can now be tasked with paying for not only victim 
restitution but also bench warrants, clerks, court-appointed attorneys, lab analyses, juries, 
drug funds, incarcerations, emergency responses, payment plans, extraditions, convictions, 
collections, drug and alcohol assessments and treatments, supervisions, and house arrest.118 
Justice system costs are not passed on to taxpayers but are placed instead on those involved 
in the system.  
Lawmakers prefer the imposition of “user” fees because they represent a source of 
revenue, in contrast to other forms of punishment which “cost a [s]tate money.”119 
Lawmakers endure little political risk around the human toll of these new sanctions because 
those most burdened are considered an unpopular segment of our society: incarcerated, 
poor, and disproportionately minorities.120 State disinvestment in local courts has impelled 
lawmakers to pass ever-increasing system costs on to “users” in the form of new or higher 
fines and fees. Judges in underfunded courts, consequently, have a perverse incentive to 
maximize “cost recovery” through the imposition of LFOs and thus exacerbate the burdens 
placed on the convicted.121 
B. LFO Debt and Racial Disparities 
Our offender-funded criminal justice system is now subsidized by the poorest 
members of society, and predominantly by people of color. In the State of Washington, 
racial and ethnic disproportionalities exist at all stages of the criminal justice system, 
including arrest, charging, conviction, and imprisonment. Black and Latinx individuals are 
sentenced more frequently and at a higher penalty rate than other populations, especially 
in comparison to Whites. Though comprising only 4.1% of the Washington’s population, 
Blacks constitute 18.4% of its prison population. 122  Blacks are 6.4 times more likely than 
Whites to be incarcerated.123 Latinx adults are 1.3 times more likely to be convicted of a 
serious felony than Whites and represent 13.2% of Washington’s prison population. Latinx 
 
114 Theresa Doyle, Legal Financial Obligations: A Ball and Chain, in MINORITY AND JUSTICE COMMISSION 
ANNUAL REPORT: WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT 9 (2015). 
115 Counties pay $153 million, while the state contributes $6 million. WASH. ST. ASS’N OF COUNTIES, 
Increased Funding for Trial Court Public Defense 3, 
http://apps.co.cowlitz.wa.us/weblinkboccworkshop/0/doc/19041798/Electronic.aspx. 
116 Id. 
117 Joseph Shapiro, Court Fees Drive Many Poor Defendants Underground, NPR (May 21, 2014), 
https://www.npr.org/2014/05/21/314607003/court-fees-drive-many-poor-defendants-underground.  
118 Harris et al., supra note 6, at 201–03. 
119 Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689 (2019). 
120 Audie Cornish, As Court Fees Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR (May 19, 2014), 
https://www.npr.org/transcripts/312158516.  
121 BANNON ET AL., supra note 22, at 28.  
122 Department of Corrections Fact Card (2016).  
123 Id. 
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defendants receive significantly greater fees and fines than similarly situated non-Latinx 
defendants.124  
Given these disproportionalities, it follows then that Black and Latinx individuals 
experience sharp racial and ethnic disparities in the amount and age of LFO debt. On a per 
capita basis, while Whites owed $210 in LFOs per 100,000 persons, Latinx individuals 
owed $235, and Blacks owed $650.125 While the number of Black and Latinx individuals 
subject to LFO debt repayments through DCAs is not recorded,126 in Washington State, 
they are also most likely to have long-term LFO debt. Approximately 17% of Blacks’ LFO 
obligations, and over 10% of Latinx individuals’ LFO obligations were over ten years old, 
compared to less than 10% for Whites.127  Given the education and employment status of 
those entering and leaving the criminal justice system, what follows from that disparity is 
the greater likelihood that Black and Latinx individuals with LFO debt are currently in or 
at risk of being referred to DCAs. Thus, these populations are more vulnerable to the 
perverse parade of financial and legal consequences that ensue. 
The proliferation of laws punishing poverty and pushing debtors into fiscal servitude 
traces its lineage to the nineteenth century practice of convict leasing. Today, with only 
slight variations, we see that the disproportionate number of victims of the modern practice 
of allowing private companies to be enriched by the poor through our criminal justice 
system. RCW 19.16.500, the focus of the next Part, is a prime example of the privatization 
of governmental responsibilities, specifically as it relates to the criminal justice system. 
How this modern bondage to debt collection agencies operates and the constitutional 
questions raised by its operation are the subject of the next Part. 
III. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF RCW 19.16.500 
The statute authorizing collection fees for LFO debt, RCW 19.16.500, presents a host 
of troubling legal and practical issues. This Part sets forth the practical impacts of the 
statute before demonstrating that its punitive intent and effects violate the excessive fines 
clause and the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and Washington State 
constitutions.  
A. Predatory Debt Collection Assessments 
RCW 19.16.500 is designed to facilitate collection services in a host of areas in which 
the government is involved. Enacted in 1982, RCW 19.16.500 originally simply allowed 
local agencies to contract with DCAs.128 The original bill also established that the contracts 
be in writing, that DCAs could annually assess statutory interest on any debt, and that 
debtors be given thirty-day notice before a debt is transferred.129 “Debt” was defined 
broadly to incorporate debts owned by any person involved in a governmental enterprise, 
 
124 KATHERINE A. BECKETT ET AL., THE ASSESSMENT AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL FINANCIAL 
OBLIGATIONS IN WASHINGTON STATE, WASH. ST. MINORITY JUSTICE COMM’N 70 (2008). 
125 Harris, Symposium, supra note 90 (power point data on file with author). 
126 Research question to Washington State Administrative Office of Courts via email (Aug. 7, 2019) (on file 
with author). 
127 Harris, Symposium, supra note 90 (on file with author). 
128 WASH. STATE LEG., 1982 FINAL LEGISLATIVE REP., 47th Leg., 1st and Spec. Sess. 76–77 (1982). 
129 Id. 
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such as educational institutions, government vendors, or in the course of providing 
residential, health, safety and welfare services.130 LFO collection on behalf of courts are 
but one of several types of services the law authorizes. That “debt” includes restitution, 
fines, fees, costs and surcharges imposed by a court upon criminal conviction.131 
The most significant amendment was added in 1997 to confer significant benefits to 
the debt collection industry.132  Where there was first no explicit allowance for a collection 
fee, legislators added the 50%/35% clause,133 and explicitly allowed that any fee set at that 
rate was presumed “reasonable.”134 It was also in 1997 that the legislature established that 
DCA “collection fee” would be treated as LFO debt.135 No public testimony was offered 
in objection to the amendments. The only testimony given on the bill were three 
representatives of a state association of debt collectors, who naturally spoke in their 
favor.136 The final amendment in 2011 strengthened DCAs right to prosecute debt 
collection actions by restricting a debtor’s statute of limitations defense to such actions.137 
An analysis of seventy-seven Washington DCA contracts reveals that DCAs have 
taken full advantage of the allowances granted in RCW 19.16.500. While collection fee 
percentages, surcharges, and remittance requirements vary by contacting DCA, the 
overwhelming majority of DCAs contract for the maximum fee allowed by statute.138 The 
lowest fixed-fee collection imposed upon LFO debtors was 19% (in six different contracts). 
Nine contracts allow DCAs to extract between 30% and 40% of the outstanding LFOs in 
fees. Ten DCAs exact a fee between 19% and 30% of outstanding LFO debt.139 Still other 
contracts impose a sliding scale percentage against outstanding LFO debt, depending on 
the age of the debt, with the lowest sliding scale fee percentage is beginning at 16.5%.140 
However, in nearly half of the contracts, the DCAs collect the statutory maximums of 50% 
and 35%.141 
Of the eighteen different DCA contractors in Washington, two—AllianceOne and 
Dynamic Collectors, Inc. (Dynamic)—account for fifty of the seventy-seven LFO 
contracts. The AllianceOne standard contract imposes a fixed 19% collection fee and uses 
a sliding scale, which starts at 19% for new debts, 24% for older debts up to four years, 
and 29% for debts that are older than four years or transferred from a different collection 
agency.142 Dynamic assesses the statutory maximum from each LFO payment. In addition 
to Dynamic, nine of the other DCA contractors assess the statutory maximum. The 
 
130 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.16.500 (4) (2019) 
131 Id. (“For purposes of this section, the term debt shall include fines and other debts, including the fee 
allowed under subsection (1)(b) of this section.”). 
132 1997 Wash. Sess. Laws 2354, Ch. 387 § 1; WASH. REV. CODE § 19.16.500. 
133 See infra Introduction, at 305–06.    
134 1997 Wash. Sess. Laws 2354, Ch. 387 § 1; § 19.16.500(2); § 19.16.500 (1)(b). 
135  1997 Wash. Sess. Laws 2354, Ch. 387 § 1; § 19.16.500(4) (the term debt includes the collection agency 
fee and restitution owed to victims of crime). 
136 It was in 2011 that the statute was amended to treat the collection fee as LFO debt. 
137 S.B. 5574, 2011 Leg., 62nd Sess. (Wash. 2011) (“no statute of limitation can be asserted against a 
collection agency if the same statute of limitation could not be asserted against the assignor governmental 
entity.”); § 19.16.500(3).  
138 See list of contracts at Exhibit A. 
139 Id.  
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 See, e.g., AllianceOne standard contract at 2 (on file with author). 
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bargained-for collection fee is triggered upon referral by the clerk of courts. By operation 
of the law, the DCA collection fee then becomes an obligation undistinguished from the 
court-imposed LFO debt.143  
The economic injustice that RCW 19.16.500 exacts lies not only in the exorbitant 
fees it permits, but the myriad ways in which RCW 19.16.500 allows DCAs to levy 
penalties extra-statutorily. LFO debt is typically paid to the DCA by or on behalf of the 
obligor on a monthly basis, with each payment being allocated to the court and the DCA 
in proportion to the contracted-for percentage.144 In addition to the collection fees, DCAs 
also charge additional fees to establish the accounts and administer payments. Account set-
up fees, monthly maintenance fees, convenience fees, payment plan fees, and late fees are 
just a few features of every contract. For example, AllianceOne also assesses account set-
up, servicing, and payment plan fees ranging from $4.75–$11.25 per month.145 Others 
charge a convenience fee for payment by credit or debit card.146 Invariably, the contracts 
allow an assessment of the 12% statutory interest rate on its collection fee. Since the DCAs 
impose these charges on a per-account, not per-person basis, if an LFO debtor has more 
than one account placed with the DCA, surcharges aggregate.  
RCW 19.16.500 compounds hardships in other ways. DCAs collecting LFO debt are 
not obligated to consider a debtor’s ability to pay, so required minimum payments can be 
set at levels that far exceed a debtor’s economic capacity. Although the new LFO laws 
disallow statutory interest to attach to initial judgments and sentencings, DCAs may still 
impose statutory interest on referred LFO accounts. In addition, DCAs also retain threat of 
incarceration of the debtor for willful failure. The concern arises in allowing DCAs the 
discretion in the first instance to determine what reasons might constitute a willing refusal 
to repay (e.g., a refusal to pay an amount a debtor cannot afford) to trigger a referral to the 
court. Thus, the potential for engaging in abusive or coercive collection tactics and the 
power to negotiate for the maximum monthly payment possible all serve to advantage the 
DCA. 
Between the collection fees, interests, and other costs levied by DCAs, the amounts 
extracted by DCAs are predatory. The exorbitant amounts raise questions about the true 
cost of collection. Reliable figures on the cost of debt collection are difficult to ascertain.147 
However over the past decade, the process of debt collection has been made more efficient 
and cost-effective. Automated payments systems, debt collection mobile phone 
applications, and the like have made remittances easier for debtors.148 On the collectors’ 
end, DCAs have long-recognized that traditional contact methods—landline calls and 
letters—are less effective given the shift to mobile and electronic communication.149 
Artificial intelligence is being used and applied by DCAs, enhancing efficiencies, pre-
 
143 See generally Blackmon, supra note 96. 
144 See, e.g., AllianceOne contract at 2; Dynamic contract at 2; Skagit Bonded Collectors at 10; Yakima 
County Credit Services at 1(on file with author). 
145 See, e.g. AllianceOne contract with Pierce County at Section 7d (on file with author). 
146 See, e.g., McDonald Credit Services for Pacific County, at https://mcdonaldcreditservice.com/#alliances  
(on file with author). 
147 Email inquiry to Washington Administrative Office of the Courts (Aug. 7, 2019) (on file with author). 
148 A number of consumer complaints lodge ‘breach of privacy’ cases when debt collection agencies track 
them through their Facebook and Twitter IDs. Nevertheless, use of social media in tracing defaulters is a 
practice that has gained popularity. 
149 Tomio B. Narita et al., FDCPA Update: An Industry in Transition, 67 BUS. LAWYER 639, 647 (2012). 
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empting debtor defaults, and enhancing recovery and debt collection rates through process 
improvements such as debt negotiation portals.150 Cell phones, text and email systems are 
pervasive, cost-efficient methods by which to reach debtors.151 Industry-specific 
technology has also made it easier to retrieve debtor names, last known addresses, phone 
numbers. Automated database search services have made skip tracing debtors, in which 
every DCAs engages, inexpensive.152 
Presumably, the collection fees, interest, and myriad surcharges demanded by DCAs 
and allowed by statute reflect the costs of debt collection and services. Yet, there is no 
evidence of legislative research into RCW 19.16.500’s 50%/35% provision and its 
relationship to true collection costs. In fact, Washington’s 50%/35% collection fee 
extraction exceeds that of other states.153 There is no evidence that LFO debtors are costlier 
to pursue than other debtor populations as to justify such fees; in fact, given their probation, 
parole, debt and/or reporting obligations, they may be easier to locate.  
The state legislature has allowed DCAs wide berth to set their rates and conferred 
extraordinary legal protections in their favor. The legislature has shielded the industry from 
significant legal challenge by deeming any amount at or below the statutory collection fee 
“reasonable,” and making the time within which DCAs may sue LFO debtors co-extensive 
with the government’s. Enabling private debt collection agencies to maximize profits off 
the backs of the poorest and most vulnerable groups serves no purpose but to unnecessarily 
perpetuate punishment.  
B. How Collection Fees Permitted by RCW 19.16.500 May Violate The ‘Excessive 
Fines’ Clauses 
1. The Federal and State Excessive Fines Clause 
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits the imposition of 
excessive fines.154 Adopted verbatim from the English Bill of Rights of 1689,155 its original 
iteration was enacted to curb the excesses of judges under the King James II reign.156 King 
 
150 Lisa Phillips & Paul Moggridge, Artificial Intelligence in Debt Collection (2019), 
https://www.advancedcollection.co.uk/Documents/ACSWP23_AI_in_Debt_Collection.pdf; Penny 
Crosman, Can AI Make Debt Collection Smarter and Easier? AM. BANKER (July 11, 2017),  
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/can-ai-make-debt-collection-smarter-and-easier (“Artificial 
intelligence, chatbots and self-service technology have reached a point where they can provide a much-
needed makeover to the collections process. Such technologies can help lenders learn to reach out to people 
at times and in channels that are more conducive to a conversation and repayment.”). 
151 Narita et al., supra note 149, at 647. 
152 Skip tracing involves the methods by which to locate the latest information about a given debtors most 
current information (phone numbers, addresses, notice of death, bankruptcies, etc.). Modern skip tracing 
revolves largely around the interrogation of many diverse databases as well as electronic information 
gathering which can be performed by purchased software or contracted out by DCAs.  
153 See supra, Introduction at 305–06. 
154 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
155 Historically there were only generally applicable limitations on the judge, when imposing the fine were 
those contained in the English Bill of Rights and the Magna Carta. For a historical summary, see United 
States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 335 (1998); Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S.Ct. 682, 693–98 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
156 Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 267 (1989) (“Across the Atlantic, this 
familiar language was adopted almost verbatim, first in the Virginia Declaration of Rights, then in the 
Eighth Amendment.”). 
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James had imposed extraordinary fines upon his political enemies, who “were forced to 
remain in prison because they could not pay the huge monetary penalties that had been 
assessed.”157 Seeking to avoid such abuses and limit the “government’s power to extract 
payments . . . as punishment for some offense,”158 the Founding Fathers adopted the 
English Bill of Rights’ prohibition against disproportionate fines into our Bill of Rights.159 
Underlying the inclusion of the “excessive” adjective was an abiding principle that no 
penalty should “be so large as to deprive [a person] of [their] livelihood.”160 Judicial abuses 
of power through the levy of fines and fees, including those imposed under the authority 
of Black Codes and the practice of convict leasing, have received persistent Eighth 
Amendment scrutiny.161 
While the Supreme Court has ostensibly narrowed the excessive fines proscription 
to constrain only those penalties directly imposed by, and payable to, the government,162  a 
closer read of its rulings and the rationale that informs the clause reveals a more multi-
faceted set of concerns. Those debating the clause in the English Bill, and in the 
Constitution, argued that fees were being used as ends separate and apart from mere 
punishment or retribution, viz., for private gain.163 The issue was not so much whether the 
government received a direct benefit from the penalty, but the more important need was to 
“prevent the government from abusing its power to punish an offender.”164 
The Excessive Fines Clause is codified in Article I, Section 14 of Washington’s 
Constitution.165 Washington courts have long interpreted the term “fine” as referring to 
costs that are levied as punishment,166 as distinguished from monetary sanctions best 
characterized as “remedial,” or “compensatory.”167 While the Washington Supreme Court 
has examined some criminal penalties in the context of excessive fines claims, it has not 
specifically examined LFOs imposed as a result of transfers under RCW 19.16.500.168 
While criminal statutes allowing for the levy of monetary penalties labeled as such are most 
obviously construed as punitive, other types of financial sanctions not so labeled may also 
be punitive. RCW 19.16.500 does not convert LFO debt into a civil action because a debtor 
who fails to pay is still at risk for criminal sanction.169 Even sanctions imposed in the 
context of certain civil processes can in fact be punitive.170 What the underlying debt does 
 
157 Id. at 267; Timbs, 139 S.Ct. at 688 (“The 17th century Stuart kings, in particular, were criticized for 
using large fines to raise revenue, harass their political foes, and indefinitely detain those unable to pay.”). 
158 Browning-Ferris, Inc., 492 U.S. at 267; Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609–10 (1993).  
159 Browning-Ferris, Inc., 492 U.S. at 267. 
160 Id. at 268. 
161 Birckhead, supra note 91, at 1630. 
162 Browning-Ferris, Inc., 492 U.S. at 268. 
163 Timbs, 139 S.Ct. at 689 (“The joint resolution that became the Fourteenth Amendment, and similar 
measures repeatedly mentioned the use of fines to coerce involuntary labor.”). 
164 Browning-Ferris, Inc., 492 U.S. at 268. 
165 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14. The United States Supreme Court recently decided that 8th Amendment 
applies to the states in Indiana v. Timbs. See generally Timbs, 139 S.Ct. 682. 
166 State v. Clark, 124 Wash.2d 90, 102–03 (1996). 
167 A monetary sanction best characterized as remedial or compensatory in nature do not come under the 
excessive fine prohibition. In re Metcalf, 92 Wash. App. 165, 178 (1998). 
168 See, e.g., In re Metcalf, 963 P.2d 911 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). 
169 In re Sanders, 589 B.R. 874, 883 (Bankr. W.D. Wash 2018) (“[C]ourt costs imposed in the Superior 
Court Sentencing Orders do not function like ordinary civil debt[.]”). 
170 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447–48 (1989) (“The notion of punishment, as we commonly 
understand it, cuts across the division between the civil and the criminal law”). 
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to the debtor—not the process by which the debt payment is enforced—should be the 
constitutional touchstone. And, as precedent prescribes, if even one aspect of a particular 
penalty the law sets forth has a punitive rationale, colorable Eighth Amendment 
considerations arise.171 
Washington’s Supreme Court has determined that whatever the parameters of the 
federal clause, “Washington State Constitution’s excessive fines clause often provides 
greater protection than the Eighth Amendment.”172 Suggested in that determination is that 
fines beyond those benefitting the government are also subject to the state constitution’s 
protections.173 Washington’s Supreme Court has indicated that restitution may be punitive 
despite the fact that it compensates the victim.174 As a result, Washington courts have 
accepted the invitation to scrutinize restitution payments through an excessive fines 
grievance.175 Consequently, the fact that the collection fees RCW 19.16.500 do not directly 
inure to the benefit of the state, but instead, to the benefit of private, third-party DCAs 
should be no shield to Eighth Amendment scrutiny.176 The focus of the whether the 
Excessive Fines Clause applies should not turn on whether the government receives the 
economic benefit, but whether the government’s directive (in this case the LFO debt 
referral) constitutes further punishment regardless of who receives the economic benefit.177 
2. Why RCW 19.16.500 is Punitive 
Whether RCW 19.16.500 imposes a punishment requires looking at the law as a 
whole, including the underlying purposes that inform it.178 The legislative history indicates 
that the statute was indeed designed to be retributive. In debating the 1997 amendment that 
added the 50%/35% collection fee, one senator noted that the effect of the law would be to 
 
171 Civil sanctions that are solely remedial, such as forfeitures of proceeds, cannot be considered 
punishment. State v. Catlett, 133 Wash. 2d 355, 360 (1997); State v. Frodert, 924 P.2d 933, 939 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1996). However, “[i]f the statutory provision has any purpose not solely remedial, the forfeiture is 
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Tellevik, 921 P.2d at 1092. See also Austin v. 
United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993) (if a sanction has a remedial purpose, but it also has a retributive or 
deterrent purpose, the Eighth Amendment is invoked).  
172 State v. Bartholomew, 683 P.2d 1079, 1085 (Wash. 1984) (“We have, in the past, interpreted Const. art. 
1, § 14 to provide broader protection than the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.”).  
173 State v. Sundust, No. 16273-7-III, 1999 WL 2513 at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 1999) (“A fine 
necessarily involves payment to the government.”). 
174 In re Metcalf, 963 P.2d 911, 920 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). See, e.g., State v. Moen, 919 P.2d 69, 72 n.1 
(Wash. 1996) (primary purpose of restitution is not compensation of victims, but rehabilitation and 
deterrence). 
175 Moen, 919 P.2d at 72 n.1 (primary purpose of restitution is not compensation of victims, but 
rehabilitation and deterrence). See also State v. WWJ Corp., 980 P.2d 1257, 1262 (Wash. 1999). 
176 WWJ Corp., 980 P.2d at 1261 (defendant’s excessive fine restitution “claim involves a genuine 
constitutional issue, but” the record is insufficiently developed to evaluate its merits).  
177 See Browning-Ferris, Inc., 492 U.S. at 275.  
178 Tellevik v. Real Prop. Known as 6717 100th St. S.W. Located in Pierce Cty., 921 P.2d 1088, 1092 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1996); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. at 619–22 (a categorical approach is necessary to 
determine whether a law is punitive for Eighth Amendment purposes). 
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“hold [] debtors accountable.”179 The insistence upon accountability is to demand that an 
offender be held answerable for their crime.180  
In interviews with legislators on a failed bill that would reduce the interest on LFOs, 
legislators were clear in their views, though not probative of RCW 19.16.500 rationales:  
“legal financial obligations [are] a system of accountability that provides the courts with 
an additional punishment and a means to supervise felony convictions…LFOs enable 
offenders to demonstrate the extent of their remorse and their understanding of their 
accountability for offending.”181 Articulating RCW 19.16.500’s purpose as accountability-
making invokes one quintessential concept that underlies our criminal justice system’s 
punitive conventions.  
The tenets of guilt, culpability, recompense and responsibility endow our criminal 
justice system. The precept of responsibility in particular views the defendant as an 
accountable agent who has violated those standards of an official conventional morality 
defined by the offense, and thus must be held liable. Consequently, given the articulated 
rationale for the law, the aim of RCW 19.16.500 is clear: it is an accountability-reinforcing 
tool, representing the ability of the state to wield its power and use the law to inflict further 
hardship on defendants in hopes to force “responsible” behavior.182 
The statute fortifies the government’s punitive purposes first by imposing additional 
sanctions upon a debtor already sentenced and fined in a court of law upon court referral. 
The sanctions triggered by the statute automatically increase the debt amount and extend 
the debt’s life—thus extending the amount of time a debtor remains under court 
supervision. Second, the statute requires no economic nexus whatsoever between the 
outstanding debt, the debtor, and the costs of collecting the LFO. Third, the statute grants 
DCAs rights to penalize LFO debtors in a manner that the government itself cannot 
exercise:  a court cannot add interest to LFO costs and must take into account an LFO 
debtor’s ability to pay. Nothing of the sort are required of DCAs. Beyond the express 
legislative intent, the features and operation of RCW 19.16.500 compel the conclusion that 
RCW 19.16.500 exacts a punishment.183   
If the law is in fact punitive, the next step is to determine whether the fine it extracts 
is excessive. Certainly, a “‘defendant's poverty in no way immunizes him from 
punishment.’”184 But in United States v. Bajakajian,185 the U.S. Supreme Court insisted 
that the fine “must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to 
punish.”186 The prevailing rule holds that a fine is excessive when it is “grossly 
 
179 WA H.R. B. REP., 1997 REG. SESS. S.B. 5827, Washington Senate Bill Report, March 4. Only three 
parties were recorded as giving testimony on the bill—each representing the Washington Collection 
Agency trade group. The amendment eventually passed the Senate by a 41-5-3 margin, and the House, 86-
12.  
180 HARRIS, supra note 9 at 83–84.  
181 HARRIS, supra note 9, at 84.  
182 Donald Braman, Punishment and Accountability: Understanding and Reforming Criminal Sanctions in 
America, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1143, 1168 (2006).  
183 See, e.g., In re Metcalf, 963 P.2d 911 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998); see generally Hudson v. United States, 522 
U.S. 93 (1997) 
184 State v. Curry, 829 P.2d 166, 169 n.3 (Wash.1992) (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 669 
(1983)). 
185 See generally United States v. Bajakajain, 524 U.S. 321 (1998). 
186 Id. at 334. 
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disproportional” to the gravity of the offense that it was designed to punish.187 What that 
means, it appears, is that a fine must “be proportioned to the offense and that they should 
not deprive a wrongdoer of his livelihood.”188 The Bajakahian touchstone of 
proportionality has been adopted by the Washington Supreme Court.189 
Thus, whether under a federal Eighth Amendment or Washington State’s Excessive 
Fines analysis, what is “grossly disproportional” must be determined on a case-by-case 
basis. If the test is a deprivation of ‘a wrongdoer’s’ livelihood, then it seems to allow to 
account for consideration of personal, subjective economic circumstances.190 If history is 
further guidance, the Magna Carta made the requirement of proportional sentencing 
explicit. In three separate provisions, the Magna Carta mandates that punishment be 
proportionate to the magnitude of the crime191 and that the courts should take into account 
both the offense and offender in determining proportionality. The type of monetary 
sanction may also be of import. Some federal courts have concluded that judges must 
consider an individual’s financial circumstances when evaluating an Excessive Fines 
claim; others have declined to consider such circumstances; still others have applied 
different analyses depending on whether the penalty is a fine, forfeiture, or restitution.192 
Washington has adopted the Bajakajian test of gross disproportionality.193 However, 
no Washington case has clarified whether a defendant’s financial circumstances must be 
considered in answering the Excessive Fines question. In fact, the few cases reaching an 
evaluation hew closely to an objective assessment of what was imposed versus what the 
statute at issue allowed.194 
3. Judicial Solutions to Excessive Fines Determinations. 
One objective approach would be to consider proportionality in terms of the DCA 
fee’s relationship to the original debt and the actual cost of collection. For example, a 10% 
 
187 Id.  
188 Id. at 335. 
189 State v. WWJ Corp., 980 P.2d 1257, 1261 (Wash. 1999). 
190 Id. at 334 (test of proportionality means the amount of the punishment must bear some relationship to 
the gravity of the offense it is designed to punish (emphasis added)); Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 
544, 559 (1993), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 869 (1997) (the question is whether the forfeiture was excessive in 
light of the criminal activity engaged in by the offender). 
191 Beth Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CAL. L. REV. 277, 320–21 (2014). 
192 A gross disproportionality analysis has not been uniformly engaged. While the Supreme Court has left 
open the question of whether inquiring into an individual’s financial circumstances is required, lower courts 
are split. Compare, e.g., United States v. Lippert, 148 F.3d 974, 978 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[I]n the case of fines, 
as opposed to forfeitures, the defendant’s ability to pay is a factor under the Excessive Fines Clause”) with 
United States v. Smith, 656 F.3d 821, 828 (8th Cir. 2011) (deeming “defendant’s inability to satisfy a 
forfeiture at the time of conviction” not relevant to constitutional analysis). The Eleventh Circuit has 
rejected consideration of an individual’s financial circumstances under the Excessive Fines Clause. See 
United States v. Seher, 562 F.3d 1344, 1371 (11th Cir. 2009). 
193 State v. WWJ Corp., 980 P.2d 1257, 1261 (Wash. 1999). 
194 In those cases, it also appears that the defendants did not argue their individual financial circumstances 
or indigency. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 875 P.2d 613 (Wash.1994); WWJ Corp., 980 P.2d at 1262 (record 
insufficiently developed). For example, in Metcalf, 963 P.2d 911, the Court of Appeals considered whether 
the costs of an inmate’s incarceration violated the 8th Amendment. In affirming that it did not, the court not 
only concluded that the costs and crime victim fine were for a non-punitive purpose, but also that the 
assessment was well below the cost of incarceration without regard to the defendant’s personal economic 
circumstances. 
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fee added to collection of a $2500.00 outstanding LFO might not be seen as grossly 
disproportional, but something that bears a reasonable relationship to the actual cost of 
collection. On the other hand, a 10% fee on a $2,000,000 judgment may compels a different 
conclusion; such an assessment amounts not only to a lifetime of servitude to the private 
debtor, it provides the DCA with a $715,000 windfall with no determination that the fee 
remotely reflects the costs of collection, or a reasonable profit. 
A better approach would be to take into consideration a debtor’s ability to pay. Given 
the Supreme Court’s proportionality rule regarding punishment, and Washington states 
demand that ability to pay inquiry must be made by a trier of fact, a similar requirement 
should be applied to DCA collection fees. Although such an approach works against 
mandatory LFOs such as restitution (which typically are imposed without regard to ability 
to pay), the stage at which a DCA has the LFO debt has built-in incentives to ensure the 
pay-down. If upon establishing what a debtor can afford after taking into account income 
and other debts (including LFO debt), that payment extends the terms of the debtor’s 
judgment and sentence, then it should be deemed excessive and unconstitutional.  
C.  RCW 19.16.500 Violates Due Process and Equal Protection Constitutional 
Provisions 
RCW 19.16.500 also triggers other constitutional concerns. As it now stands, LFO 
debt transfer occurs without adequate notice and hearing and lacks an ability-to-pay 
determination on a thirty-day delinquency. Finally, the disparate treatment of LFO “debt” 
under RCW 19.16.500 in contrast to other consumer obligations held by DCAs raises equal 
protection issues. Each of these contentions are addressed here.  
1. Due Process Concerns 
The 14th Amendment applies to the imposition of financial obligations on indigent 
criminal defendants, demanding both procedural and substantive due process.195 
Procedural due process requires fair notice of the conduct that will subject one to 
punishment.196 Substantive due process demands that certain fundamental rights are 
shielded from government constraint.197 Given the deprivations that attend referrals of LFO 
debt to DCAs, the risk of error, and the fact that such referrals act as punishment, 
fundamental processes should be in place. 
As set forth in Part(II)B, the legislative history of RCW 19.16.500 and the rights 
it confers to DCAs regarding LFO demonstrate its punitive intent and effects. Perhaps the 
 
195 U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V, XIV, § 1; WASH. CONST. ART. I, § 3; see, e.g., State v. Blank, 930 P.2d 1213, 
1219 (1997) (citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 667–68 (1983)). 
196 BMW of N. Am, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996); Didlake v. Washington State, 345 P.3d 43, 
47 (Wash. 2015) (“To determine what procedural protections due process requires in a particular situation, 
a court must consider three factors: (1) the private interest affected, (2) the risk that the relevant procedures 
will erroneously deprive a party of that interest, and (3) any countervailing governmental interests 
involved.”). Both procedural and substantive due process are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
generally Nielsen v. Dep't of Licensing, 309 P.3d 1221 (Wash. 2013). 
197 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). What “process” is “due” requires consideration of three 
issues: (1) the private interest affected by the official act; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of life, 
liberty or property interest through the procedure at issue and any probable value of different or additional 
safeguards, and (3) the government’s interest, including administrative or fiscal burdens that the new 
safeguards might impose. Id. 
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most opprobrious way in which RCW 19.16.500 exacts a due process violation is that it 
transmutes a DCA “collection fee” into LFO debt. Upon the Clerk’s referral and the 
DCA’s act of assessing the “collection fee,” that fee becomes an LFO itself and thus 
extends the debt’s life of the LFO originally imposed by the Court. Until paid in full, like 
the original LFO sentence, LFO obligations augmented now by the DCA “collection fee” 
remain a mandatory condition of probation, parole or other correctional supervision. As 
direct result of the fees that the DCA is allowed to extract without adequate notice or 
opportunity to be heard, DCAs impose fees that can become larger than the original LFO 
debt and continue to subject LFO debtors to all of the collateral consequences associated 
with the original court sentence.   
As RCW 19.16.500 exacts additional punishment, then, an inquiry into reasons for 
non-payment and ability to pay should come at that “point of collection and when sanctions 
are sought for nonpayment,”198 before the debt is referred to the DCA. Such an approach 
is what the Washington Supreme Court urged in State v. Nason.199 James Nason was 
ordered to pay $25 per month toward his LFO starting on August 15, 2006 under an auto-
jail provision.200 The provision was a part of Spokane County's LFO agreement forms, 
which included spaces for entry of monthly payment amount, a review date, a date on 
which the defendant was to report to jail to serve a sentence, and the length of the 
sentence.201 On the review date, a court collection deputy would examine the case to 
determine if Nason was current with his monthly payments.202 If Nason was not current 
with his payments and had not filed a stay, Nason was required to report to jail on the report 
date to serve the predetermined jail sentence.203 Nason did not make his payments and was 
jailed. The court agreed that the automatic jail provision, which provided an avenue to 
incarceration, violated his due process rights.204 Even though Nason had the burden to 
demonstrate that his nonpayment was not willful, “[b]ecause due process requires the court 
to inquire into Nason’s reason for nonpayment, and because the inquiry must come at the 
time of the collection action or sanction, ordering Nason to report to jail without a 
contemporaneous inquiry into his ability to pay violated due process.”205 
While Nason dealt with liberty interests, attempts to extend LFO obligations beyond 
the original sentence have also been held to violate due process. In In re Brady,206 Brady, 
a juvenile defendant, was found guilty of two crimes: second degree malicious mischief 
and second-degree theft.207 In his judgment orders and sentence, the judge required him to 
pay a total of $3,000 in restitution and $200 in a penalty assessment. Approximately ten 
years later, the prosecutor moved for an ex parte order to extend the jurisdiction for 
collection of the LFOs, as allowed by statute.208 Brady objected to the trial court’s grant of 
 
198 State v. Blank, 930 P.2d 1213, 1220 (Wash. 1997). 
199 State v. Nason, 233 P.3d 848 (2010). 
200 Id. at 850. 
201 Id. at 850–51.  
202 Id. at 851. Nason’s payments were to begin on August 1, 2007, but if “the defendant has not complied 
with the payment schedule, nor filed a motion with the court for a stay by the review date, the defendant is 
to report to jail on 11/14/07 by 4:00 p.m. to serve 60 days in jail.” Id.  
203 Id. at 851.  
204 Id. at 852.  
205 Id. at 851–52.  
206 In re Brady, 224 P.3d 842 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). 
207 Id. at 843. 
208 Id.  
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the prosecutor’s motion on the grounds that, inter alia, because the extension of the LFOs 
affected a property interest, he was entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard.209  
The appellate court agreed, but it first determined that the State was untimely in its 
attempt to extend jurisdiction.210 The court held that Brady had a due process right to 
receive notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to entry of the ex parte orders if the 
court was modifying its original judgment or imposing further punishment.211 The issue 
thus turned on whether the action “modif[ied] the original terms of the judgment[] and 
sentence”.212  
RCW 19.16.500 exacts a deprivation of the property of the LFO debtor and does so 
without adequate notice or opportunity to be heard. Even if the fees imposed under the 
statute do not constitute punishment, they do amount to a property deprivation. If those 
fees are punitive, then there is all the more reason to ensure due process protections. In 
comport with basic due process, a debtor must actually be given notice of the consequences 
of non-payment. Notice only that the debt will be referred out for collection is insufficient; 
debtors must be given notice of the additional costs that ensue from that referral. Hearings 
should comport with the requirements of RCW 10.01.180, which requires a willful failure 
to pay determination before the clerk may transfer the LFO debt as urged in Nason and 
Brady. 
2. Equal Protection Concerns 
It is well understood that a court violates equal protection obligations when it 
automatically converts unpaid legal financial obligations to a jail sentence solely because 
the defendant is indigent and lacks the ability to pay.213 Washington courts have also 
consistently held that a court may not revoke probation because of a defendant’s inability 
to pay LFOs.214 Similarly, equal protection questions are raised when the law allocates 
legal burdens based on one’s indigency.  
Upon referral to a DCA, LFO debt is treated differently in constitutionally significant 
ways. Unlike debt reposed with the Clerk, LFO debt is still subject to statutory interest. 
Unlike what must occur at sentencing, an ability-to-pay assessment must be undertaken 
before establishing LFO payments. The Washington Collection Agency Act (CAA or 
Act)215 regulates collection agencies and includes extensive and detailed prohibited 
collection practices.216 The Act proscribes DCA conduct with respect to debtor’s claims, 
which is defined as “any obligation for the payment of money or thing of value arising out 
of any agreement or contract.”217 However, the LFO debt authorized under RCW 19.16.500 
“include[s] fines and other debts” and allows for the collection fee. In Washington, 
collection agencies and lobbyists have argued that LFO debt is not a “claim” for purposes 
 
209 Id. at 844.  
210 Id. at 847–48. 
211 Id. at 848. 
212 See generally State v. Hotrum, 87 P.3d 766 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).  
213 Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398–99 (1971); State v. Curry, 829 P.2d 166, 168-169 (1992) (holding that 
mandatory victim penalty assessment does not violate the equal protection clause on its face as penalizing 
indigence. Debtors can only when compelled to pay in the case of indigence). 
214 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983). 
215 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.16, et. seq. (2019). 
216 § 19.16.250. 
217 § 19.16.100(2). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY   [2020 
 330
of the CAA.218 This position and RCW 19.16.500 raises at least two equal protection 
concerns.  
If DCAs are not subject to the debt collection practice proscriptions of the CAA for 
LFO debt, LFO debtors remain vulnerable to a host of actually or potentially abusive 
collection practices. Moreover, under such a regime, there would be no clear statutory 
remedies for those who fall victim to those practices.   
LFO debt is disadvantaged in yet another way. RCW 19.16.500 transforms the DCA 
“collection fee” into LFO debt.219 As LFOs are not dischargeable in bankruptcy,220 a 
critical (yet untested) possibility is that the DCAs’ “collection fee,” now an LFO debt, is 
non-dischargeable as well. This possibility has serious ramifications for LFO debtors and 
their ability to seek relief in courts. The exorbitant collection fee must be paid off in full—
like the original LFO debt. The annual interest that DCAs can exact on the debt is not 
waivable (as would be the case for all non-restitution debt imposed by a court). Again, the 
law effectively treats LFO debt differently than other types of debt and thus reinforces its 
punitive nature and demands reform. 
IV. RCW 19.16.500 REFORM PROPOSALS 
Beyond its constitutional infirmities, RCW 19.16.500 exacerbates hardships on the 
recently incarcerated and diminishes the likelihood that any indigent LFO debtor will be 
able to rise out of poverty and untether him or herself from the criminal justice system. In 
light of the legal, policy, practical, and moral concerns raised by DCA service of LFOs, 
there are scores of important reforms that should be considered. This Part describes a 
selection of these reforms.  
A. Exempt LFOs from RCW 19.16.500. 
Aside from the fundamentally moral and social policy rationales, exempting LFOs 
from RCW 19.16.500 is the best solution from a purely economic standpoint. In posing 
heightened barriers to community re-entry, mounting evidence shows that jurisdictions, on 
average, collect a small fraction of the LFOs levied. Nationally as of 2017, ten million 
people owe $50 billion in criminal fees, fines, forfeitures, and restitution.221 Debt collection 
involves scores of un-tabulated expenses, including salaried time of court staff, correctional 
authorities, and state and local government employees. Arresting and incarcerating people 
for debt-related reasons is particularly costly, especially for sheriffs’ offices, local jails, 
and for the courts themselves.222  
According to data compiled by the Washington Administrative Offices of the Courts 
for the years 2014-2016, the LFOs which were actually paid into the courts woefully trail 
behind the LFOs imposed. Of the over $130 million of LFOs imposed in courts of general 
jurisdiction, only $7.8 million or 6% has been paid. As for the courts of limited jurisdiction, 
 
218 Personal notes from Washington Collection Agency Bureau hearing on rulemaking (Apr. 17, 2018) (on 
file with author).   
219 A S. B. REP., 1997 REG. SESS. S.B. 5827 Washington Senate Bill Report, March 18, 1997, p. 2354.  
220 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (2018); In re Sanders, 589 B.R. 874, 883 (Bankr. W.D. Wash 2018). 
221 Martin et.al., supra note 107, at 5. 
222 BANNON ET AL., supra note 22, at 10–11.  
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only 5.1% of the $88 million in LFOs imposed ($4.5 million) has been paid.223 There is no 
indication that debts are being paid down more quickly once LFOs are referred out to 
private DCAs. To the contrary, the likelihood of a LFO debtor fulfilling his or her 
obligation becomes bleaker as DCA referral merely sinks the LFO debtor deeper into debt. 
DCA referral may ultimately be financially self-defeating, where the government ends up 
chasing debt that is simply uncollectable.  
If crime reduction, victim compensation, rehabilitation, and state cost recoupment 
are the policy goals behind RCW 19.16.500 and the entire LFO regime, the system has 
been a failure.224 Policymakers should evaluate whether LFO debt referral makes economic 
sense for the state or the debtor. Costs of popular debt collection methods such as DCA 
referrals, as well as arrests, incarceration, or driver’s license suspensions, should be 
assessed. Included in that assessment should be consideration of the salary and time spent 
by employees (court officials, police officers, clerks, bailiffs) involved in collection, and 
the effect of chosen collection methods on payment reentry and recidivism. Any conclusion 
that the public and systems are better served by returning the administration of LFO 
collections to the courts will likely also require a fundamental shift in how our court and 
penal institutions are funded—a move away from the offender-funded system ethos that 
has far too long informed our subsidization approach. 
B. Cancel the Contracts 
Given the punitive nature of RCW 19.16.500, short of legislative LFO exemptions, 
courts should cancel the contracts and reclaim jurisdiction over debt collection. Counties 
and municipalities contract with DCAs for a term of years,225 but without exception, the 
contracts allow for cancellation upon certain notice terms upon, for example, 30 or 60-day 
notice.226 In addition, on a case-by-case basis, courts are able to “claw back” LFOs referred 
out. By statute and by contract, courts retain the power supervise the servicing of LFO debt 
by DCAs. RCW 36.18.190 maintains that “[t]he servicing of an unpaid court obligation 
does not constitute assignment of a debt, and no contract with a collection agency may 
remove the court’s control over unpaid obligations owed to the court.”227 In addition, a 
feature of most contracts allows for unilateral contract cancellation and for the recall of 
any particular LFO debt.228 While this too will involve a serious examination of costs of 
 
223 Studies conducted in other states reveal similar levels of futility. In Florida, 4.9% of $709 million; in 
Iowa, of $159 million ordered, only 12% has been collected; and in Texas, only 5.3% of $43 million of 
outstanding debt owed. Martin et al., supra note 107, at 12–13. 
224 Alexes Harris et al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary 
Untied States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753, 1792 (2010).  
225 See, e.g., AllianceOne-King County contract (three years) (on file with author).; Gila LLC-Snohomish 
County contract (two 1-year terms, one 3-year term) (on file with author).; Yakima County-Yakima County 
Credit Services contract (1 year) (on file with author).; Skagit County-Skagit Bonded Collectors (3 year) 
(on file with author).  
226 See, e.g., Yakima County-Yakima County Credit Services contract (on file with author); Personal 
Services Agreement between Skagit County and Skagit Bonded Collectors (July 23, 2018) (on file with 
author).  
227 Personal Services Agreement between Skagit County and Skagit Bonded Collectors (July 23, 2018) (on 
file with author). 
228 Dynamic Collections and East Wenatchee Municipal Court provide an example: “Any judgments 
referred to the [DCA] may be withdrawn by the Court at any time unless legal action has been commenced 
by the [DCA].” Id. at 3.  
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returning the collection processes back “in house,” this evaluation must be engaged. Courts 
may have little ability to influence the mandatory fines and fees imposed through certain 
laws, such as restitution and VPA fees. However, courts directly control the manner in 
which LFOs are collected and have the capacity to cancel these contracts.  
C. Curb Unfair Debt Collection Practices 
It is the industry position that debt DCAs service under RCW 19.16.500 must be 
treated differently from the debt it services under the provisions of the CAA, which ensures 
that DCAs abide by fair debt collection practices.229 As a result, LFO debtors are left 
vulnerable to unfair, deceptive, and even coercive acts. Because debtors remain at risk of 
arrest and conviction if they do not pay their LFO debts on a regular basis, DCAs are 
incentivized to engage in threats and other coercive conduct which, under every 
circumstance violates debt collection practice laws.230 Moreover, because DCAs need not 
regard an LFO debtors ability to pay—even if a court has to—they are able to use their 
leverage the LFO debtors tenuous legal circumstances to extract unfair and unsustainable 
monthly payment arrangements. 
One legal advocate recounted the experience of her client: What started out at $3,400 
in principal ballooned to over $12,000 in LFOs, interest, and the 50% collection fee. The 
client was in his fifties and had child dependents and a job, but the DCA would accept 
nothing less than $200.00 per month. He could not pay. As result, the DCA initiated 
garnishment proceedings such that he could no longer pay basic living expenses.231  
D. Require DCA Collection Fees to Bear Some Rational Relationship to True Costs of 
Collection 
If RCW 19.16.500 continues to apply to LFO debtors, the exorbitant fees, costs and 
surcharges must be reined in. Washington could do so by including robust consumer 
protections regarding fee extractions relative to service costs. An example from federal 
mortgage regulations is instructive. 
In the pre-recession era, mortgage lending abuses were rampant, with brokers and 
banks charging excessive fees associated with closing costs. Abuses included overcharging 
for credit reports and deed recording, inflating appraisal costs, or unbundling fees (e.g., 
charging a “loan origination fee,” in addition to charging for underwriting and loan 
preparation—tasks which should be covered in the loan origination fee).232 Such hyper-
predatory charges (e.g. $150.00 to obtain a borrower’s credit report; $150.00 to mail loan 
documents) were found to bear no relationship to the actual costs of the services 
provided.233 As an anti-predatory measure, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act was 
revised, such that fees for mortgage broker services had to bear a reasonable relationship 
 
229 Collection Agency Board Meeting Notes (Apr. 2018) (on file with author).  
230 WASH. REV. CODE § 36.18.190 (2019). 
231 Monica Llorente, Criminalizing Poverty Through Fines, Fees, and Costs, ABA (Oct. 3, 2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/childrens-rights/articles/2016/criminalizing-
poverty-fines-fees-costs/.  
232 Bryan Adamson, The Homeowners’ Illusory Safety Net: Mortgage Broker Surety Liability, 47 GONZ. L. 
REV. 165, 186 (2011). 
233 Jessica Fogel, State Consumer Protection Statutes: An Alternative Approach To Solving The Problem of 
Predatory Mortgage Lending, 28 Seattle U. L. Rev. 435, 438 (2005). 
Vol. 15:3]    Bryan L. Adamson 
 
 333 
to the value of services or goods actually performed or provided.234 Under pain of penalty, 
this law proved to be successful in curtailing unfair, deceptive and abusive practices, and 
at aligning consumer charges more with the actual costs of providing mortgage lending 
services.235 A 35% “collection fee”—to say nothing of a 50% one—should be not only 
unconscionable, but presumptively unreasonable under the law.   
E. Disallow Transfers to DCA After Only Thirty Days 
Courts, as the first party creditor, are not required to adhere to the Fair Debt 
Collections Practices Act (FDCPA) or state laws that apply to third-party collection 
agencies.236 Under common practices, a creditor can refer a debtor to collections when 
a default has technically occurred—even if it is one day late. As a result, RCW 
19.16.500 allows clerks to refer LFO debts to collection after only thirty days.237 While not 
strictly improper, this thirty-day time frame is harsh and bears no resemblance to industry 
debtor-creditor practice. In traditional commercial transactions, sixty or 180-day 
delinquencies are common time frames upon which debts are referred to debt collection 
agencies.238 Given the severe economic and punitive consequences of DCA transfers on 
LFO debtors, the thirty-day time frame should be revised if the system remains at all.  
F. Disallow Statutory Interest 
Allowing DCAs to collect statutory interest does little but ensure greater private 
profit. Statutory interest allows agencies to layer on costs over and above the 50%/35% fee 
allowed by statute, further increasing the amount and the life of the debt. 
G. Require an Ability to Pay Analysis 
Imposing collection fees runs contrary to the public policy concerns that prompted 
the amendment to statutes to limit LFOs imposed on individuals who are indigent or have 
 
234 See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 C.F.R. 1024.14 (2011) (“Prohibition against 
unearned kickbacks and fees. **** (b) No person shall give and no person shall accept any fee, kickback or 
other thing of value pursuant to any agreement or understanding, oral or otherwise, that business incident to 
or part of a settlement service involving a federally related mortgage loan shall be referred to any 
person.**** (3) Multiple services. When a person in a position to refer settlement service business, such as 
an attorney, mortgage lender, real estate broker or agent, or developer or builder, receives a payment for 
providing additional settlement services as part of a real estate transaction, such payment must be for 
services that are actual, necessary and distinct from the primary services provided by such person.”). See 
also 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (2018). 
235 See generally 12 U.S.C. 2607 et. seq.  
236 The FDCPA defines a creditor as the person or entity that extends credit in the first instance. The 
FDCPA is designed to protect consumers against third-party debt collectors, not the original creditor. 15 
U.S.C. § 1692a(4) (2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.16.100(5)(b) (2019). 
237 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.16.500(2) (“No debt may be assigned to a collection agency unless (a) there has 
been an attempt to advise the debtor (i) of the existence of the debt and (ii) that the debt may be assigned to 
a collection agency for collection if the debt is not paid, and (b) at least thirty days have elapsed from the 
time notice was attempted.”). 
238 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB COMPLIANCE BULLETIN 2015-05 2 (Oct. 8, 2015), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201510_cfpb_compliance-bulletin-2015-05-respa-compliance-and-
marketing-services-agreements.pdf.  
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an inability to pay.239 As a constitutional imperative, pre-referral hearings should be 
required. DCA referrals impose greater economic obligations regardless of the type of LFO 
debt and extend the term of court supervision. Consequently, hearings that assess willful 
refusal to pay and ability to pay—now required by courts—must be required of DCAs 
holding LFO accounts.  
If a court determines that a LFO non-payment was willful, a DCA referral can go 
forward. From there however, the court should also determine whether any referral of the 
defendant’s debt—based upon the terms and conditions of the DCA-court contract—would 
constitute an unconstitutionally excessive fine. If it is determined that the LFO debtor can 
be referred to the DCA, then DCAs should not have the discretion to set the monthly 
payment amount. The court or clerk should inquire an establish a payment amount based 
on the defendant’s individual financial circumstances.  
H. Make Contracts Uniform 
Contracts between courts and DCAs vary widely.240 That variance includes the 
additional fees and charges an LFO debtor is assessed. In turn, this creates additional 
uncertainties and heightened obligations for LFO debtors. Bringing contract uniformity 
will enhance predictabilities for courts, improve the experience (and thus perhaps the 
repayment yield) of debtors, and minimize tools DCAs can leverage through individual 
contracts to extract additional fees and surcharges. 
CONCLUSION 
RCW 19.16.500 represents a severe and likely unconstitutional flaw in our criminal 
justice system that prolongs LFO debtors’ involvement in that system for reasons that can 
only be described as punitive. Through an analysis of how the law operates, one can see it 
as yet another example of how our public criminal justice system has become privatized. 
Sadly, this is nothing new. As in the past, Black and Latinx persons are the ones 
disproportionately consigned by courts to pay their debt to society which places their fate 
into the hands of private enterprises. Those DCAs presently engaged in holding formerly 
incarcerated persons in debt bondage, have been conferred broad discretion and perverse 
incentives to engage in predatory and abusive debt collection practices. Beyond its 
unconstitutionality, RCW 19.16.500, in tethering formerly incarcerated persons to a 
lifetime of government supervision, works to undermine the pro-social ideals that 
undergird our criminal justice system’s rehabilitative goals. The statute exacerbates 
inequality by creating for many what will become an insurmountable, lifetime barrier to 
financial stability, housing security, employment opportunity, community reintegration 
and full citizenship.    
 
239 Travis Stearns, Legal Financial Obligations: Fulfilling the Promise of Gideon by Reducing the 
Burden, 11 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 963, 967 (2013). 
240 See infra, Part III at 319.  
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Table A: County and Municipal Debt Collection Agency Contracts in Washington State  
Court Collection Agency Collection-fee Percentage241 
Anacortes Municipal Debt Collection specialists  19%242 
Asotin County District  Credit Bureau of Lewiston-
Clarkston, Inc. 
50% 
Battle Ground Municipal  Dynamic  50%, 35%243 
Benton County District  Washington Collectors Tri-cities  40% 
Bothell Municipal  AllianceOne 29%, 24%, 19%244  
Burlington Municipal Dynamic  50%, 35% 
Clark County District  AllianceOne 19% 
Clallam County I district Dynamic  50%, 35% 
Clallam County II district Dynamic  50%, 35% 
Clallam County Superior  Dynamic  50%, 35% 
Chelan County  Armada Corp  40% 
Columbia District Court  Professional Service Bereau 50%, 35% 
Cowlitz County District  Dynamic  35% 
Des Moines Municipal  AllianceOne 29%, 24%, 19%  
Douglas County District  Dynamic  50%, 35%  
East Wenachee Municipal  Dynamic  50%, 35% 
Oakville Municipal  Dynamic  50%, 35% 
Elma Municipal  Dynamic  50%, 35% 




City of Federal Way 
Municipal 
AllianceOne 29%, 24%, 19%  
Ferndale Municipal AllianceOne 29%, 24%, 19% 
Franklin County District  Washington Collectors Tri-cities  40% 
Fife Municipal  AllianceOne 19% 
Garfield County District  Armada Corp  50%, 35% 
Grant County District  Credit Service of Central 
Washinton  
50%, 35% 
Grays Harbor District  Dynamic  50%, 35% 
Grays Harbor Superior  Dynamic  50%, 35% 
Hoquium Municiapl  Dynamic  40% 
Issaquah Municipal AllianceOne 29%, 24%, 19%  
Jefferson County District  Dynamic  50%, 35% 
Kent Municipal AllianceOne 24% 
 
241 As against the outstanding LFO debt transferred. 
242 This represents a flat fee collected against all LFO debt.  
243 Jurisdictions with 50%/35% fees represent DCAs taking the statutory maximums against LFOs below 
and above $100,000. 
244 The first percentage figure represents the collection fee assessed against any LFO debt older than ten 
years. The second percentage figure represents the collection fee assessed against any LFO account 
transferred that is five-to-ten years old. The third percentage figure represents the collection fee assessed 
against new account. 
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Court Collection Agency Collection-fee Percentage241 
King County District  Transworld Systems Inc. 16.5%, 22%, 28% 
Kirkland Municipal  AllianceOne 29%, 24%, 19%  
Kitsap County Superior  Dynamic  50%, 35% 
Klickitat West Dsitrict  AllianceOne 19% 
Klickitat East District  AllianceOne 19%, 24%, 19% 
City of Lake Forrest Park 
Municipal  
Allied Credit Services Inc.  35% 
Lakewood Municipal Court  Dynamic  50%, 35% 
Lewis County Superior 
Court  
Dynamic  50% 
Lynwood Municipal AllianceOne 29%, 24%, 19% 
Manson County Superior Dynamic  50%, 35% 
Mercer Island Municipal  AllianceOne 29%, 24%, 19% 
Mount Vernon Skagit Bonded Collectors LLC 30% 
Ocean Shores Municipal  Dynamic 50%, 35% 
Okanogan County District  Dynamic 50%, 35% 
Okanogan County Superior 
Court  
Dynamic 50%, 35% 
Pacific County Court  Mcdonald Credit Services  50% 
Pacific municipal  Alliance One  29%, 24%,19% 
Pasco Municipal  Washington Collectors Tri-cities  40% 
Pierce County Superior  AllianceOne  27%, 32%, 37% 
Fircrest Municipal  Dynamic  50%, 35% 
Buckley Municipal  Alliance One  29%, 24%, 19% 
Pend Oreille County 
District   
Peterson Enterprise Inc. 30% 
Raymond Municipal  Mcdonald Credit Services  50% 
Renton Municipal AllianceOne 19%, 24%, 29% 
San Juan County District Allied Credit Companies  50% 
Sedro-Woolley Municipal Debt Recovery Specialists 33.33% 
Selah Municipal AllianceOne 29%, 24%,19% 
Skagit County  Skagit Bonded Collectors LLC 35% 
Snohomish County  Gila LLC, dba Municipal Services 
Bureau Government Services 
22.54% 
Snohimish County District  AllianceOne 29%, 24%, 19% 
Stevens County District  Armada Corp  40% 
Sumas Municipal  AllianceOne 19% 
Tonasket Municipal Court  Armada Corp  50%, 35% 
Bonny Lake Municipal 
Court  
PSC Inc. 50%, 35% 
Thurston County District  Account Managers Inc.  25%, 20% 
Upper Kittitas County 
District  
AllianceOne 19%, 24%, 29 % 
Wahkiakum County 
District  
Dynamic  50%, 35% 
Walla Walla County 
District  
Dynamic  50%, 35% 
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Court Collection Agency Collection-fee Percentage241 
Wapato Municipal  Evergreen Financial Services  50%, 35% 
Whatcom AllianceOne 29%, 24%, 19% 
Whitman  AllianceOne  29%, 24%, 19% 
Yakima County  Yakima County Credit Services 50%, 35% 
 
